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Queer Identity? Discussing Identity and Appearance in an On-Line “Genderqueer” 
Community 
Sharla N. Alegria 
ABSTRACT 
The relatively new field of Queer Theory creates ways of thinking about people 
living without binary gender, but does not provide for a research model with which to 
give context to the material struggles of such people. Through the use of Internet 
discussion groups, the current research project attempts to examine the challenges that 
people who identify with the concept “genderqueer” describe facing as they fashion 
selves in social interactions; a process which inevitably requires consumer goods that 
typically only allow for heteronormative binary gender. Findings suggest that there are 
similarities in how respondents came to identify with “genderqueer,” but such similarities 
are less present in how they understand and apply the concept to themselves. This study 
shows a potential conflict arising between academic Queer Theory, which seeks to 
deconstruct identity categories, and a more popular use of “genderqueer” claimed as an 
identity by some respondents. In conclusion this thesis examines possibilities for activism 
and marketing that may come out of “genderqueer” as a widely recognizable identity 
category. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 “Really though, all I know is that I hate clothes. I hate what they can do, the things they 
can say, the ways they're used, missused, missunderstood and I especially hate having to 
go shopping for them.”  
   
 Shopping has been conceptualized as liberating, empowering, narcissistic, 
community forming, alienating, and even transformative (Wilson, 1989; Baudrillard, 
1969; Chau, 1992; Leach, 1994; Shields, 1992). For many people shopping can be a 
release from the stressors of work and home, a productive leisure time activity, or even 
an obsession. Yet others experience shopping as one of many loci of their social 
marginality; stores and malls are a palpable environment of perceived misunderstanding 
and disapproval. My exploration of understandings and experiences of identity and 
appearance of gender variant folk came partly out of my involvement with an on-line 
community for people who identify with the term “genderqueer” and partly out of my 
frustration with the constant gendering of apparel and accessories. I heard echoes of my 
own experiences from other community members and saw the group both supporting and 
strategizing alternative ways to wear and places to purchase clothes. People all over the 
country were describing their frustration with being called “sir,”  “ma’am,” “he,” or “she” 
despite their attempts to look ambiguous and they came to each other for support and 
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advice for “presenting” (a term many community members use)  as more or less 
feminine, masculine, or androgynous. 
Stores themselves contribute to the consistent dichotomous gendering of social 
subjects. Although some stores sell clothes associated with different sub-cultural groups, 
nearly all neatly separate out the clothes intended for men from the clothes intended for 
women. Even children’s clothing stores contain separate sections for infant boys and 
infant girls. Clothes are not the only consumer products that are overtly gendered; soap, 
shaving supplies, perfumes, belts, nearly anything that a person can put on their body is 
gendered by production, packaging, and placement. Stores often go so far as to put men’s 
and women’s body products in separate aisles or on separate sides of isles. Products with 
no obvious difference, such as athletics shoes and belts, are often sized differently and 
put in women’s or men’ sections of stores. Most people probably never seriously question 
why they shop in the part of the store specifically designated for the gender with which 
they identify. Stores neatly divided into dichotomous masculine and feminine sections, as 
well as products carefully labeled and sold as women’s and men’s illustrate and 
contribute to the categorization of post-industrial Americans as always exclusively either 
masculine indicating a male body or feminine indicating a female.  
For most people the sex marking of many consumer items intended for bodies is 
not a topic of great consideration. Sonograms tell doctors a baby’s sex then the doctor 
tells the parents who begin to make preparations to teach the child gender to match sex 
category1 (West and Zimmerman, 1987). Maintaining clear lines around sexuality is done 
 
1 I am using West and Zimmerman’s (1987) phrase sex category to imply the way that people are placed 
into either the male or female sex category first by doctors, then parents and most every one else with 
whom they interact. As soon as a person can be placed into a sex category they are held accountable for 
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in hospitals by surgically “correcting” the genitals of any child whose sex may otherwise 
be ambiguous (Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Kessler, 1998). As children get older they learn 
from their parents what is considered appropriate for people of their sex category. When 
children go to school proper gender behavior is enforced by separate bathrooms, gym 
classes, and other institutionalized activities, but it is also reinforced by the children 
themselves as they both learn to play with and to hold each other accountable to gender 
norms for their sex category (Thorne, 1993).  
Appearing and moving through the world in clearly feminine or masculine ways 
seems to be an implicit part of being human for most Americans. For decades feminist 
scholars have been examining and deconstructing gender norms. Social constructionist 
literature on gender shows how dichotomous gender roles are transmitted, learned, 
enforced, acted out, and emulated by people, young and old, everyday. There have also 
been volumes of social science work looking at the ways in which consumer culture, 
including advertising, media, and consumer goods illustrate, proscribe, and reinforce 
gender norms. While both sets of literature provide excellent analyses of how gender gets 
to be dichotomous in the social world and how consumer culture and gender norms inter-
relate there has been little work done that acknowledges that there are people who are not 
comfortable identifying with heteronormative gender expectations but must find a way to 
negotiate a dichotomously gendered consumer society.  
 As both a feminist scholar and a person who does not comfortably identify with 
either side of the gender binary, I am afraid that the lack of work done in this area is a 
 
behaving and appearing in the ways that have come to be associated with that category. The consequences 
for not conforming to these expectations, or for not being recognizable as fitting into either the male or 
female sex category can be fatal. 
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subtle way in which the scholarly work that argues for the deconstruction and blurring of 
gender identity boundaries fails to provide for a viable alternative. Issues related to 
transitioning from one binary gender category to the other as well as studies of drag seem 
to be popular among scholars of Queer Theory2, while the difficulties of living with a 
non-gendered identity are not nearly as well represented3. 
 My research seeks to understand how people who identify with the term 
“genderqueer” understand gender, negotiate identifying with an identity that is not 
discursively available in many social situations, and experience using, presenting and 
purchasing consumer goods. While identification with the word queer may mean vastly 
different things to different people, I will use the word “genderqueer” throughout this 
paper out of linguistic necessity to describe the group of people with whom I am 
working. Furthermore, “genderqueer” is the word that people involved with my study 
have chosen to call themselves. This research will attempt to address the lives of people 
who do not identify consistently as men or women yet must still present themselves in 
social interactions. The problem this group would seem to face is that they must either 
use gendered consumer goods, such as clothes bought from stores or find an alternative 
such as making their own clothes in order to interact with others in public spaces. The 
potential problem I am attempting to investigate may not turn out to be an issue for social 
actors moving through the world, but it does represent a failure of queer theory to deal 
with the practical issue of shopping in a consumer world that only allows two genders 
and expects those genders to match only two sexes in heteronormative ways. This 
 
2 Judith Halberstam’s work on drag kings and FTM surgery, Judith Butler’s work on drag, and Dean 
Spade’s work on FTM surgery to name a few. 
3 The anthologies PoMosexuals and GenderQueer are two books that do deal with the difficulties of living 
in opposition to binary gender, but neither offers alternatives to the projects they describe. 
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research examines issues of identity, presentation, and consumption faced by 
“genderqueer” consumers. Specifically, I am most interested in clothes, accessories, and 
body products because those items are most intimately attached to the person and as they 
make up the tools for the fashioning of appearance. I do not wish to presume or imply 
that all of the people with whom I collaborated to research this thesis attempt to present 
themselves as androgynous, rather they do not see masculine and feminine as necessary 
ways for humans to be and incorporate at least some part of that belief into their 
understanding of themselves. 
Queer Theory  
Queer Theory enters this thesis in two ways. First, it helped to frame my research 
question and research method. My understanding of refusing categorization and blurring 
binary identities comes from Queer Theory. I could not have asked the questions or 
conceived of the particular group of people I chose to work with had it not been for 
Queer Theory. Second, it enters this thesis by way of the respondents themselves. When 
this project was in its early stages, I was warned that by focusing my sights on people 
who self-identify as genderqueer, I would necessarily limit the project to others who 
would had read the theory books I had read, sat through classes similar to those I had sat 
through, and that these informants would reiterate the theory I had read back in the form 
of narratives of personal identity. As it turns out, what I heard from my informants did 
contain elements of the theories I had read but did not include references to books or 
articles or specific concepts. These subjects were not just like me; bits of theory had 
reached them, somehow, but they were not engaged with it through academic studies in 
the way that I am.  This suggests to me that Queer Theory has, at least in some ways, 
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made inroads into more popular understandings of identity. My focus for this thesis is 
therefore on the understandings and actions of fleshed people, albeit by accessing only 
their online talk, rather than on the theory that makes it possible to think and write about 
queer(ing) identity. Regardless of my specific focus, Queer Theory is a prominent 
framework for both my understanding of the group with whom I worked and the ways the 
group talked about their understandings of gender and the problems they have 
encountered. For this reason a discussion of Queer Theory is necessary before a full 
explanation of the research. 
  Joshua Gamson states that Queer Theory attempts “to take apart the [sexuality] 
identity categories and blur the group boundaries. This alternative angle, influenced by 
academic ‘constructionist’ thinking holds that sexual identity categories are historical and 
social products, not natural or intrapsychic ones” (Gamson, 1996; 391). The key to 
ending oppression, in this model, is to refuse categorization (Gamson, 1996). In his 
introduction to the anthology Queer Theory/Sociology Steven Seidman writes “queer 
theory wishes to challenge the regime of sexuality itself, that is, the knowledges that 
construct the self as sexual and that assume heterosexuality and homosexuality as 
categories marking the truth of ourselves” (Seidman, 1996; 12). A body that cannot be 
categorized as male or female can neither be categorized as hetero- or homosexual. While 
examples of people transgressing, or transitioning across gender lines before the 
articulation of queer theory are available (such as Leslie Feinberg’s Stone Butch Blues 
(1993), Judith/Jack Halberstam’s work on drag kings (1994, 1998, 1999), and images 
from the Stonewall Riots), the idea of taking on a gender identity that is neither maleness 
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nor femaleness would have been unthinkable before queer theory problematized 
heteronormativity.  
Queer Theory works to break down dichotomies, blur boundaries, and illuminate 
the role of language in stabilizing and reproducing normative social structures. As a 
theoretical construct, “queer” can be used to destabilize categories and confuse 
definitions; however it is a construct that has come to have serious consequences for 
people’s lives and self understandings. The word “queer” is used sometimes to describe 
an identity category of people who are outside gender or sexual orientation norms, which 
actually works against Queer Theory. It is also sometimes used as an umbrella term to 
describe anyone who is not straight. More true to the academic use of the word, queer 
should be understood as a process of identity; rather than being queer one does queer or 
one is becoming queer. As a concept, it should not be understood as a fully inhabited or 
completely defined category of identity (Butler, 1993). Its meaning is unstable, temporal, 
situated, used for its momentary political efficacy and future oriented imagining (Butler, 
1993). In other words the word “queer” from Queer Theory is intended to destabilize 
identity, not to create another identity category.  
 My goal for this project is to give voice to problems of identity performance faced 
by a group of people who discursively exist only because of the branch of critical 
feminist thought that has now become Queer Theory. The description and deployment of 
queer(ing) identity by academia has created a new possibility for personhood, an idea I 
will return to in the next chapter. I do not mean to imply that people who did not identify 
exclusively with either masculinity or femininity did not exist before Queer Theory, 
rather I mean to say that talking about them before would been very different. Queer 
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Theory made it possible to adopt an identity in critique, or a position of “neither nor,” in 
a way that is a personal/political statement rather than psychological disorder. 
I will use the phrase “genderqueer” in this project to describe the people with 
whom I worked. By using the word “genderqueer” I wish to imply a way of thinking 
about gender rather than any clear, common practice. I do not wish to presume that 
everyone who identifies with queer(ing) gender tries to look androgynous in every 
interaction all the time, nor do I wish to assume that gender identity is the most salient 
identity issue for everyone who identifies this way. For some, simple things such as 
referring to significant others in gender neutral terms such as partner is queering gender. 
For others, refusing to come out and identify their sexual orientation may be a way of 
queering gender. From my own casual observations I have seen a widely diverse group of 
people claim to identify with genderqueer, including drag kings and queens, transsexuals, 
androgynes, gays, lesbians, cisgender folk4, and even people in heterosexual marriages. 
What I do mean to imply is that this group holds in common an understanding of gender 
as fluid and more than binary and resists that binary. I am using the word genderqueer 
here out of linguistic necessity. It is a function of language that giving an idea a word also 
gives it a fairly stable definition. Any work that I do using “queer” as a concept must be 
understood as temporally, politically, and situationally limited to the specific people with 
whom I worked.   
It may not be possible for me to achieve my goals and stay entirely true to the 
theoretical framework that I must use in order to be able to talk about queering gender. 
Queer(ing) identity should be understood not as something one is, but rather something 
 
4 A person whose physical sex at birth has followed a heteronormative trajectory; for example a person 
born female, raised as a girl, and identified as a woman. 
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one does. The word genderqueer then should be understood as a group of acts, intentions, 
and ideas that need to be given a word if I am to write about them coherently and not as a 
static identity category. The people who made this study possible do not all use the 
concept the same way, nor do they understand or experience the social imperatives of 
gender in the same way. This thesis may well walk the line between coherence and 
incoherence in places, but perhaps this is necessary in order to attempt to do justice to the 
complexity of people’s lives and the demands of a theoretical framework that blurs 
boundaries and critiques language.  
Coming to Queer Subjectivity and Beginning Queer Research 
 Like any research project, this project is reflective of my social perspective and 
theoretical orientations.  This project comes partly out of my own frustration with trying 
to negotiate consumer goods to fashion a self that will lead others to categorize me and 
therefore interact with me in the ways that I want. It also comes from belonging to 
communities, both on-line and face-to-face, where I see others struggling with similar 
issues, though often from different perspectives. Carol Guess stated one problem of queer 
theory very well when she wrote “gender may be a performance, but it is a fleshed 
performance, potentially painful or aware of its prowess” (Guess, 1997; 161). I do gender 
and I am very much aware of myself doing it. The experience may be uncomfortable or 
erotic or any number of possible outcomes, but I am fully aware and acting as an agent 
doing gender. I am also aware of many other people struggling with similar issues, with 
similar goals, though possibly for reasons and in contexts different from my own.  
 The process of coming to identify myself with queering gender has largely 
resulted from reading and studying Feminist and Queer Theory. I did not think of my 
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discomfort with dresses, frustration with purses, or complete bewilderment by make-up 
as particularly meaningful until I began studying gender in college. When I turned 18 I 
even got a tattoo that is understood to mean “she” in language that does not contain such 
pronouns. My logic at the time was that I could not possibly regret this tattoo because I 
would never not be a “she.” Less than a year later I read part of Judith Butler’s Gender 
Trouble for the first time and began exploring less normative, more theoretical and 
academic ways of understanding gender and sex. It took a couple of years of study to be 
able to understand that Queer Theory looks at gender as a production, a constant process 
of doing or performing what is taken to be expected of social actors based on the sex 
category to which they have been assigned (West and Zimmerman, 1987). This constant 
process of producing, doing, and/or performing gets repeated until it feels natural; so 
much so that even female athletes may wear make-up to practice, claiming that they feel 
“naked” or “not right” without it (Crawley, Foley, and Shehan, forthcoming).  
 At the same time that I was studying Queer Theory and Sociology I was also very 
fortunate to have been in an environment where experimenting with gender and sexuality 
was encouraged and supported. I found other people who were dealing with similar 
questions and realizations from different perspectives on different paths. I learned the 
value of words and the importance of using them in politically efficacious ways as 
situations may require. In my everyday life I learned to live with the categorization and 
accountability I know others will subject me to while maintaining an uncertainty or 
ambivalence about identity, especially as it pertains to my body (West and Zimmerman, 
1987). 
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  I have been fortunate to have had the support of primary significant others, as 
Berger and Luckmann (1969) would use the term to describe the people who are most 
important in shaping the way individuals can understand reality. Still, I find it hard to 
manage the tension I feel when I am called “ma’am” or to assuage the embarrassment of 
someone who calls me “sir” then notices the protrusions on my chest. It is easy enough 
for me to think about my self-fashioning, a term borrowed from Tasmin Wilton (2004) to 
describe the process of shaping an ever changing presentation of self out of available 
consumer goods, from a purely theoretical perspective in which I can understand gender 
to be a harmful social construct that I do not apply to my own self understanding. This 
project of constructing my subjectivity out of theoretical concepts that deconstruct and 
blur identities works only until I step away from books and papers and classrooms and 
start interacting with fleshed people in the social world.  
 I identify with, not a gender, but a gender project that critiques, deconstructs, and 
blurs binary gender connected to binary sex through parody, satire, and inappropriate 
citationality. The problem that I face is that this identity project is only discursively 
available in the theoretical work that I study and within small subcultural groups such as 
the on-line community that I mentioned earlier. While others who study Queer theory 
may understand my identity project, when I walk out of the classroom or away from 
particular groups of people, I am seen as a masculine female often a butch lesbian, a 
category in itself that is cause for alarm for many social actors as Judith/Jack Halberstam 
points out (Halberstam, 1998). The problems of recognition and performance working 
against my identity project became sharply visible to me about a year ago when I decided 
that my new job as a research assistant working in elementary schools and my escalating 
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responsibility as a graduate teaching assistant could be better accomplished with a self-
presentation that was more “put-together.” I decided to start updating my wardrobe to 
include more items such as dress slacks, button down shirts, and polos that I did not 
select for their holes or unusual colors at thrift stores. Off I went to the mall armed with a 
gift card for PacSun, a store selling clothes intended to indicate a skateboarding/surfing 
lifestyle. After giving the sales associate a bit of anxiety over which term of respectful 
address to use (he called me “ma’am” then looked me up and down for a few seconds 
before nodding to himself and continuing with his statement) I found my way to a store 
that had a less specialized clothing selection and less attentive employees. My 
sophisticated theory could not help me negotiate the interactions I was having in the mall; 
it did not lessen the anxiety I felt when shopping in the men’s or boy’s section or 
bringing men’s clothes to the women’s fitting room.  
 The problems I experienced shopping are hardly revelatory. They could be seen 
as similar to the “bathroom problem” analyzed by Judith/Jack Halberstam (1998) in 
Female Masculinity and often described or depicted in accounts of transpeople.  
Halberstam writes:  
“Ambiguous gender, when and where it does appear, is inevitably 
transformed into deviance, thirdness, or a blurred version of either male or 
female. As an example, in public bathrooms for women, various bathroom 
users tend to fail to measure up to expectations of femininity, and those of 
us who present in some ambiguous way are routinely questioned and 
challenged about our presence in the ‘wrong’ bathroom” (1998; 20).  
 
Halberstam argues that “women’s restrooms tend to operate as an arena for the 
enforcement of gender conformity” (Halberstam, 1998). She points out that the dynamics 
of men’s restrooms tend to be different, more sexually charged; individuals are subjected 
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to less scrutiny, but the stakes may be higher if someone fails to “pass” (Halberstam, 
1998). Bathrooms, from Halberstam’s view, can be seen as a space where presentation of 
a correspondingly gendered and sexed self is put to the test. The stakes and degree of 
scrutiny may be different in women’s and men’s bathrooms but people are still subject to 
some level of accountability for presenting gender in a way that does not deviate from 
others’ interpretation of their sex category (West and Zimmerman, 1987; Crawley, Foley, 
Shehan, forthcoming).  
 The experience of shopping for clothes that do not present a clearly 
heterogendered5 self and the perceived scrutiny and surveillance of store associates and 
other customers presents a space in which the possibilities for fashioning a gendered self 
are policed (Ingraham, 1994). Where gendered self-fashioning is tested in bathrooms, 
gendered self-fashioning is produced with the items available for purchase in stores. 
Shopping can be viewed as a sort of liminal middle stage between Goffman’s frontstage, 
where social actors present themselves to an audience of other social actors, and 
backstage, where social actors are not in the presence of others and they can prepare for 
future presentations (Goffman, 1959). I use the word liminal to invoke the idea of being 
between presentations and preparing for presentation where the possibility for fashioning 
a vastly different person is ever present. In “Shopping for Women’s Fashion in 
Singapore” Beng Haut Chua points out that putting together appearance is necessarily 
backstage activity with store associates as coconspirators in the production of a personal 
front, gatekeepers that make sure clients do not embarrass themselves by wearing the 
 
5 I am using the term “heterogender,” borrowed from Chrys Ingraham (1994) to indicate the normative 
expectations that sex is either male or female, male bodied people are masculine and female bodied people 
are feminine, and that men and women belong with each other.  
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same outfit as another client or purchasing unflattering clothes (Chua, 1992). Chua was 
researching high end fashion boutiques where clothing is very expensive and a high 
degree of service is expected. For most consumers of limited means store employees are 
less coconspirator and more dressing room openers and cash register operators. Social 
actors must still present themselves to others in stores even as they go about the 
backstage activity of purchasing new materials to fashion selves in other arenas and store 
employees may serve as obstacles to self-fashioning in a deviant manner. Furthermore, 
short of making or altering clothes themselves, social actors can only chose from the 
commercial items available to them in stores, catalogues, or on-line to fashion a self.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature 
Interaction and Identity 
 Becoming a social actor means sharing a collectively meaningful reality with 
others. In Society as Subjective Reality, Berger and Luckmann lay out a framework for 
understanding how members of a society come to experience a reality that makes sense 
and has meaning subjectively and objectively. Subjective meaning is meaning for the 
individual, while objective meaning is not intrinsically true, but collectively held by 
members of a social group. They identify what they call “three moments, externalization, 
objectification, and internalization that characterize all parts of society” (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966; 129). They argue, “the same is true of the individual members of 
society, who simultaneously externalizes his own being into the social world and 
internalizes it as an objective reality” (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; 129). In other words, 
individual people present the reality or facts of their being as they understand themselves. 
The constant reinforcement of these “facts” by others leads the individual to believe and 
internalize them as objectively real. They argue that, “to retain confidence that he is 
indeed who he thinks he is, the individual requires not only the implicit confirmation of 
this identity that even casual everyday contacts will supply, but the explicit and 
emotionally charged confirmation that his significant others bestow on him” (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966; 150). Supporting this view of identity, Gauthier and Chaudoir found in 
 16
                                                
their ethnographic content analysis of female-to-male transsexual (FTM) Internet 
communities that FTM’s use the Internet to form communities where they can both 
exchange tips on being treated as male in their interactions with others and feel 
reaffirmed in their masculine presentation even if only on-line (Gauthier and Chaudoir, 
2004). In other words, a person comes to understand their6 identity to be real because 
people around them interact with them as if they understand that identity to be real also, 
and in order to maintain an identity it must be constantly confirmed, especially by those 
who are most significant to the individual. In the case of transpeople, being recognized 
and treated as their gender of choice by others reaffirms their personal sense of identity. 
 While interacting with others, people engage in collective processes of sense 
making or reality construction in which people act in ways that are consistent with social 
structures that are already in place (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, Cahill, 1998). Spencer 
Cahill, like Berger and Luckmann, uses the interactional model of person production, but 
focuses on the coercive power of person types and the accountability people have for 
doing the identity type that they embody. He argues that “collective conceptions of or 
institutions of the person are even possible only owing to exterior movements that 
symbolize and delineate them in some outward appearance; that is, they must be 
expressively embedded in bodily individuals” (Cahill, 1998; 135). In other words, 
socially meaningful person types are only possible because of acts and appearances that 
people present in and on their bodies. Those presentations are not entirely the doing of 
the individual. Individuals learn from interactions with others what is available and/or 
required of them to identify within the social structure. They are then held accountable 
 
6 I wish to use a gender neutral pronoun here. Even though “their” is grammatically incorrect, it serves my 
purpose better than most other choices. 
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for the person type they are engaged in doing in social interactions. These types are based 
on outward displays embedded in bodies. People will act towards each other based on the 
commonly understood characteristics and expectations of the kind of person with whom 
they interpret themselves to be dealing. Being viewed as a competent social actor entails 
“doing” the person type that matches the presumed presented person type.   
 Gregory Stone also examines the importance of appearance in social interaction. 
He writes; “One appears, reflects on that appearance, and appropriates words of identity, 
value, mood, or attitude for himself in response to that appearance. By appearing, the 
person announces his identity, shows his value, expresses his mood, or proposes  his 
attitude (emphasis in original Stone, 1961; 101).  Stone uses the term “programs” to 
describe a person’s responses about their own appearance and the term “reviews” to 
describe others, responses to a person’s appearance. He argues, “When programs and 
reviews tend to coincide, the self of the one who appears (the one whose clothing has 
elicited such social responses) is validated or established, when such responses tend 
toward disparity, the self of the one who appeared is challenged, and conduct may be 
expected to move in the direction of some redirection of the challenged self” (Stone, 
1961; 92). From Stone’s argument, social actors can be expected to either revise their 
appearance or their identity if their program is consistently challenged. 
 Individuals can and do negotiate the way they are interacted with and the ways 
they interact with others to more closely display the type of person they see themselves to 
be. Gauthier and Chadoir show with the case of Female to Male transpeople in online 
communities that people can study the characteristics of types of persons and 
presentations, but they will be held accountable for the identity they are perceived to have 
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by others. The degree to which an individual’s subjective sense of identity is reaffirmed 
depends on how convincingly they can appear to match the characteristics of the person 
type they understand themselves to be and the degree to which they pass the interpersonal 
tests of accountability for that group.  
 Donileen Loseke’s forthcoming article on narrative identity adds a much needed 
aspect of telling and acting out acceptable stories in order to situate identity within shared 
matrices of social meaning. She uses the term “formula stories” to describe “typical 
actors engaging in typical actions within typical plots with typical moral evaluations” 
(Loseke, forthcoming). Such stories situate actors in widely recognized and understood 
social classifications. Loseke further argues: 
 “[S]tories that seem too different from culturally sanctioned narratives 
might be evaluated as untrue or incredible and the story-teller evaluated as 
mad. The implication here is that social members must use socially 
circulating stories as a member’s resource . . . There is considerable 
evidence that broadly circulating formula stories function in the 
background of our thinking and provide hypotheses and sometimes filter 
our perceptions” (Loseke, forthcoming).  
 
In other words, socially viable identities, or person types, must be storied in ways that 
recognizably fit with that identity. For example it would not be possible to be understood 
as a mother without caring for children. There are steps, processes, and attitudes both past 
and future that are part of the formula stories for cultural identities.  
 Furthermore these identities and stories are not static; existing stories may change 
and new stories may emerge making for new possibilities for personhood. Ian Hacking 
argues that it is only possible to be a certain kind of person in specific, historically and 
socially situated moments (Hacking, 1986). To make his point he uses the example of 
split personality disorder. He writes, “multiple personality as an idea and as a clinical 
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phenomenon was invented around 1875: only one or two possible cases per generation 
had been recorded before that time, but a whole flock of them came after” (Hacking, 
1986; 223). His claim, which he terms “dynamic nominalism,” is that “a kind of person 
came into being at the same time as the kind itself was being invented” (Hacking, 1986; 
228). The people and the category emerged simultaneously, each shaping the other. 
“Making up people changes the space of possibilities for personhood,” or creating a new 
category of people creates the possibility for people to be understood as instances of that 
category. The possibilities for personhood change, meanwhile the people who are 
understood to fit the category shape the category as well.  Hacking sees identity as two 
vectors: 
 “One vector is labeling from above, from a community of experts who 
create a “reality” that some people make their own. Different from this is 
the vector of the autonomous behavior of the person so labeled, which 
presses from below, creating a reality every expert must face” (Hacking, 
1986; 234).  
 
 The phenomenon Hacking described creates a sort of loop where a label is created 
by experts, people are so labeled, then the label is characterized by the behavior of the 
people it is used to describe. It is difficult to fully see “genderqueer” fitting into the loop 
in the same way it is possible to fit “homosexual” into the loop. Homosexual was a legal 
and moral label given to a group who claimed the label and developed a whole movement 
around it (Hacking, 1986). “Queer” on the other hand is launched as a critique of identity 
categories, but in critiquing binary identity Queer Theory made room for queer(ing) 
identity. In Bodies that Matter Judith Butler writes, “if the term ‘queer’ is to be a site of 
collective contestation, the point of departure for a set of historical reflections and futural 
imaginings, it will have to remain that which is, in the present, never fully owned, but 
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always and only redeployed, twisted, queered from a prior usage and in the direction of 
urgent and expanding political purposes” (Butler, 1993; 228). From Butler’s work 
“queer” can be seen more as a political tool claimed but not owned, relinquished and 
redefined, recycled, constantly moving, shifting, always becoming and never quite 
arriving.  The description and deployment of queer(ing) identity by academia has 
however created a new possibility for personhood. Some questions that remain to be 
answered, however, are what will be required for the personhood made possible by Queer 
Theory to become widely recognizable, and just how possible is it for individuals to 
claim an identity position if that position is not recognized by a community of others. 
Gender in Interaction and Identity  
 According to the highly influential work of Don West and Candace Zimmerman 
and Judith Butler, the social reality of gender is reproduced and reinforced through 
repeated gender performance of individuals whose credibility as social actors is at stake 
(West and Zimmerman, 1987; Butler, 1990). Social constructionist perspectives on 
gender hold that gender is learned, performed, and enforced through social interactions 
with peers, media, and other social actors. Furthermore, such arguments separate gender 
from sex, or a person’s appearance, activities, and ideas from that person’s sex organs; 
some then go on to show how physical sex is also influenced by social expectations about 
gender. Candace West and Don Zimmerman wrote in “Doing Gender,” “the ‘doing’ of 
gender is undertaken by women and men whose competence as members of society is 
hostage to its production” (West and Zimmerman, 1987; 126). They use sex to refer to 
biological criteria, sex category to refer to placement based on sex criteria even though it 
is not displayed in every day interactions, and gender to refer to “the activity of managing 
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situated conduct in light of normative conceptions of attitudes and activities appropriate 
for one’s sex category” (West and Zimmerman, 1987; 127). 
  While displaying gender may be optional, being seen as an instance of either 
male or female sex category by others is not. Doing the activities, appearance, and 
attitudes of the appropriate sex category is a way of claiming social value and 
competence as a social actor. Take for example the act of shaving one’s legs; instead of 
understanding shaving one’s legs as something women do because they want to, West 
and Zimmerman and Butler would argue that people who want to have social credibility 
as women shave their legs because they see it as part of an ideal of femininity. The 
decision not to shave one’s legs is easy enough to make, but it would mean losing 
credibility as a competent female. Gender is not an essential truth of bodies as much as a 
learned system of acts performed and interpreted as citations, or alignments with and 
references to previously established models of masculinity or femininity.  
In her influential early work Gender Trouble Judith Butler argues; 
 
“Gender ought not to be construed as a stable identity or locus of agency 
from which various acts follow; rather, gender is an identity tenuously 
constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through a stylized 
repetition of acts. The effect of gender is produced through the stylization 
of the body and, hence, must be understood as the mundane way in which 
bodily gestures, movements, and styles of various kinds constitute the 
illusion of an abiding gendered self. . . Significantly, if gender is instituted 
through acts which are internally discontinuous, then the appearance of 
substance is just that, a constructed identity, a performative 
accomplishment which the mundane social audience, including the actors 
themselves, come to believe and to perform in the mode of belief” (Butler, 
1990; 179).  
 
In other words, gendered acts are outwardly displayed and repeated. These acts have 
meaning that is temporally and socially specific. For example, shaving one’s legs is a 
 22
feminine act in the contemporary United States but it does not carry the same meaning 
in other places, nor has it carried the same meaning at other times in the history of this 
country.  Contemporary American women shave their legs because that is one of the 
many feminine acts whose repetition constitutes them as women. Being female is not 
what makes them shave their legs, shaving their legs, along with numerous other acts 
that stylize their everyday appearance, mannerism, and speech genders them hetero-
feminine and shows them to be an appropriate female. Gender is not an identity one can 
fully inhabit, rather it is accomplished through the repeated performance of acts, and it 
gains the appearance of substance, or it seems to be real, because social actors believe 
their actions as well as the actions of others to reflect the natural activities of people, 
marking them masculine or feminine in accordance with their sex. 
Butler also points out that, “gender norms operate by requiring the embodiment of 
certain ideals of femininity and masculinity, ones that are almost always related to the 
idealization of the heterosexual bond” (Butler, 1993; 232). In so much as heterosexuality 
is one of the primary organizing institutions of social life, gender norms operate to 
produce heterosexual people. Chrys Ingraham argues that heterosexual marriage is used 
as the romantic end goal of gender socialization. She uses the term “heterosexual 
imaginary" to describe a  
"belief system that relies on romantic and sacred notions of 
heterosexuality in order to create and maintain the illusion of well-being. . 
. through the use of the heterosexual imaginary, we hold up the institution 
of heterosexuality as timeless, devoid of historical variation, and as 'just 
the way it is' while creating social practices that reinforce the illusion that 
as long as this is 'the way it is' all will be right in the world" (1999; 16).  
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The imaginary part of the term "heterosexual imaginary" is meant to indicate the way that 
people see their surroundings in terms of themselves, imagining that everyone and 
everything around them is just like them. These factors all combine to make a circle of 
heterosexual beings. Children are taught to follow gender norms so they can be 
heterosexuals and gain status because “boys just naturally like girls,” because their 
parents “just liked each other” and they got married, because that is what people do. The 
heteronormative ideal reinforces gender into two dichotomous categories based on sex. If 
men must marry women, and everyone should get married, then everyone must be either 
a man or a woman. Formula stories that do not support heteronormativity are either 
unavailable or classify a social actor or deviant or pathological. 
Queering Bodies 
 Recognizing a social actor as fitting neither male nor female heterogender 
becomes difficult or impossible for many because it is a subject position that is simply 
not a potential identity category for many people. Queering gender and sexuality attempts 
to question and refigure this formula, but refiguring the formula is no small task when 
dichotomous heterogender is reinforced even at the level of altering physical bodies that 
do not “naturally” reflect it. Anne Fausto-Sterling, a feminist biologist, has provided 
multiple examples and numerous arguments of the influence of gender expectations over 
bodily sex. Her book Sexing the Body examines the decisions that doctors make when 
confronted with an infant born with genitalia that is neither clearly male nor female. She 
argues that "labeling someone man or woman is a social decision" and that "our beliefs 
about gender- not science- can define our sex” (Fausto-Sterling, 2000; 3).  Rather than 
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arguing that sex defines or leads to gender, her work shows that social beliefs about 
gender can shape sex.  
 Fausto-Sterling describes a genetic difference that causes XX chromosome babies 
to be born with masculine external genitalia and fully functional internal female genitalia. 
In some cases, these inter-sexed infants can grow to be healthy reproductive women after 
surgery.  These children become women by most appearances, but they have male 
external sex organs. Biologically, their sex is ambiguous. The doctor and parents, in such 
cases will decide to surgically make the child either male or female and the parents will 
likely try to teach the child gender, to fit into the assigned sex category. If the doctors and 
parents are successful the child may never know he or she was born with ambiguous 
genitalia.  
Current medical technology allows doctors to look at sonograms and determine 
the sex of a fetus in utero. Based on this information parents will often begin to prepare 
for the gendering of the child. They may have a room prepared that is full of pink or blue 
clothes, gender-specific toys, and other accoutrements before a child is even born. 
Fausto-Sterling points out however, that when viewing a sonogram, doctors are looking 
for the presence or absence of a penis. The absence of a penis signifies female, however, 
a child with XY chromosomes may have a penis too small for the doctor to see. Doctors 
are concerned that male children are "able to pee standing up and thus to 'feel normal' 
during little boy peeing contests; adult men, meanwhile, need a penis big enough for 
vaginal penetration during sexual intercourse" (Fausto-Sterling, 2000). Even though the 
primary concern of most doctors is to preserve reproductive function, they are not likely 
to construct a penis for otherwise male children whose penises are “too small.” Fausto-
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Sterling shows that "surgeons aren't very good at creating the big strong penis they 
require men to have" (Faust-Sterling, 2000; 59). Thus, a child born with a penis "less than 
1.5 centimeters long and 0.7 centimeters wide results in female gender assignment" 
(Fausto-Sterling, 2000; 60). Fausto-Sterling is able show that sex is influenced by 
heteronormative gender expectations; male children must grow up to be men who can 
vaginally penetrate women, while female children must grow up to be women who can 
be vaginally penetrated by penises.  None of this is prescribed by nature; rather it is the 
social definition of woman and man. 
Fausto-Sterling’s work is important because she broke down the sex/gender 
connection from a natural science perspective and she also gave evidence to blur the 
boundary between social construction and essentialism, or nature vs. nurture, by showing 
that even physical bodies – what we take to be nature – are influenced by socially 
constructed ideas about gender. Feminist scholars had been making arguments about the 
social construction and performance of gender for at least a decade before Fausto-
Sterling’s book, the most influential among them probably being Judith Butler.  She 
argues that “‘sex’ is a regulatory ideal whose materialization is compelled, and this 
materialization takes place (or fails to take place) through certain highly regulated 
practices" (Butler, 1993; 1). In other words, femininity and masculinity are models to 
which people are compelled to attempt to achieve by regulating social forces. By 
repeating acts associated with one sex or the other people give materiality to gender and 
thereby perform their gender in accordance with their sex. Furthermore, she argues that 
declaring the sex of a body compels the gendering of that body, and acting in 
appropriately gendered ways gives that body subjectivity. 
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‘To the extent that the naming of the ‘girl’ is transitive, that is, initiates the 
process by which a certain ‘girling’ is compelled, the term or, rather, its 
symbolic power, governs the formation of a corporeally enacted 
femininity that never fully appropriates the norm. This is a ‘girl,’ however, 
who is compelled to ‘cite’ the norm in order to qualify and remain a viable 
subject. Femininity is not the product of choice, but the forcible citation of 
a norm, one whose complex historicity is indissociable from relations of 
discipline, regulation, punishment. Indeed, there is no ‘one’ who takes on 
a gender norm. On the contrary, this citation of the gender norm is 
necessary in order to qualify as a ‘one,’ to become a viable as a ‘one,’ 
where subject-formation is dependent on the prior operation of 
legitimating gender norms” (Butler, 1993; 232). 
 
 Butler and West and Zimmerman differ in their approaches in several ways that 
are instructive for thinking about actual people “doing queer gender.” Butler was writing 
her initial work on gender performativity at the emergence of queer theory. She was 
concerned not only with how gender is “done,” but also how gender can be “undone.”  
Her motives are political and she is interested in queering gender, for this reason I will 
revisit her work in this project. West and Zimmerman wrote “Doing Gender” before 
queer theory discursively came into existence. They were writing from the perspective of 
symbolic interaction, focusing on the ways that people act towards and interact with each 
other. West and Zimmerman also use the idea of person categories and introduce a notion 
of an “if-can” test to explain how people put others into categories and hold them 
accountable for the traits associated with members of that category. They write “the 
application of membership categories relies on an ‘if-can’ test in everyday interaction. 
This test stipulates that if people can be seen as members of relevant categories, then 
categorize them that way” (West and Zimmerman, 1987; 133). In so much as the relevant 
gender categories are masculine and feminine since they reinforce heteronormativity, and 
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“queer” is less an identity category than a critique of identity categories, people who 
identify with queering gender identity will be seen and held accountable as either males 
or females with prescribed heterogender expectations in many mundane social 
interactions, such as dealings with strangers in shopping centers.  For an individual who 
identifies with queering gender, being categorized as male or female means being treated 
as and held accountable for performing masculinity or femininity, even though the 
individual would not categorize themselves as fitting into either heterogender category. 
 Gender performance is primarily based on heteronormative notions of masculinity 
and femininity and any other sort of gender performance is likely to be subject to social 
pressure to conform. Examples of coercion to adopt and perform heteronormative gender 
can be found in rude comments to homosexual and androgynous appearing people, 
questioning or calling security for androgynous looking people in gender segregated 
public bathrooms, and extreme hate crimes such as the murders of Brandon Teena and 
Matthew Shepherd.  
 Taking these understandings of sex, gender and identity together as they build on 
each other, individuals present their identities to others bodily, through appearance and 
performance. Gender identity then is made socially meaningful by its repeated 
performance by individuals both in their appearance and their interactions with other. 
Furthermore, individuals are coerced to “do” gender recognizably as either male or 
female. Missing from this theoretical view of gender performance is a discussion of what 
kinds of tools individuals use to produce a gendered appearance.  
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Queer(ing) Gender  
 Whether or not a person identifies themself as either male or female, other social 
actors will assign them to one category or the other to maintain a sense of reality in which 
heteronormativity is an organizing social principle. As Marylin Frye argues in The 
Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory, most every object and institution is sex 
marked. This sex marking of everything from bathrooms to deodorant serves to reinforce 
the binary gender system and make alternatives inarticulable.  
 Michel Foucault argues that “we must not imagine a world of discourse divided 
between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse 
and the dominated one, but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into 
play in various strategies” (Foucault, 1978; 100). Power is found in discourse, in the 
normal, the abnormal, in the spaces that are not given names. 
 Butler’s example of drag and Gauthier and Chaudoir’s Internet ethnography of 
FTM support communities show that people can and do learn to perform gender opposite 
to that of the sex category to which they were assigned. These examples show that 
individuals are aware of how to properly and improperly do gender appropriate to both 
sex categories. Doing queer gender, then, means acting and appearing in such a way that 
is not appropriate to either heteronormative sex category. If social subjectivity is 
contingent on performing expected heterogender identity for male and female bodies , it 
would seem as if people who do not identify themselves as heterogendered may not have 
credibility as social actors. Others would likely categorize them as male or female and 
hold them accountable for heterogender expectations to which they may or may not have 
interest in conforming. 
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Self Fashioning and Consumer Goods 
 Presenting a person is first done through symbolically meaningful outward 
expressions (Cahill, 1998). More simply stated, appearance and movement are the 
primary indicators used by others to place a person in a category. Movement, such as 
manner of walking or sitting is done by the individual, but appearance in Western 
capitalist countries, with few likely exceptions, must be purchased. The tools for making 
up appearance, clothes, hair, skin, etc. are consumer products that are symbolically 
objectively meaningful when read on bodies. It is the stylizing of appearance, done 
through the use of consumer goods, that gives materiality to gender.  A person is 
successful in performing gender through the use of appropriate consumer goods. 
 Herbert Blumer, wrote in The Methodological Position of Symbolic 
Interactionism, “symbolic interaction . . .sees meaning as arising in the process of 
interaction between people. The meaning of a thing for a person grows out of the ways in 
which other persons act toward the person with regard to the thing” (Blumer, 1969; 4). 
People come to associate meanings with objects based on how they see others act towards 
those objects. Furthermore, as Blumer borrowed from his teacher George Herbert Mead, 
“the parties to such interaction must necessarily take each other’s roles” (Blumer, 1969; 
9). In other words, people understand objects as having meaning based on the way they 
see the objects being used and interpreted by others. Individuals not only understand the 
object as having meaning, but they anticipate the meaning that others will associate with 
the object. These meaning laden objects are integral for the formation and display of 
identity. They are not mere artifacts created from thin air; however, almost without 
exception, at least in post-modern capitalist American society, they are consumer goods.   
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 I do not mean to ignore the importance of elements of appearance such as skin 
color, age, or ability, but consumer goods go over all these bodies and create different 
types of persons that are intelligible to others. For this reason, as well as a few others 
which I will explain, I wish to borrow the phrase “self-fashioning” from Tasmin Wilton 
rather than using the more traditional “project of self” or “identity formation” to describe 
the process individuals go through in order to present themselves. This concept, as she 
uses it, highlights how presentation of self is something that is not only done through 
interaction but is also done in a specific cultural time and place with specific resources in 
a given semiotic landscape (Wilton, 2004). Not only do the resources have meanings but 
they are primarily consumer goods, and as consumer goods they have symbolic value 
more than the cost of labor and material. The resources themselves have meanings and 
they are not necessarily what the individual would want. This idea of “self-fashioning” 
conjures an idea of identity that is similar to seasonal fashion spreads in magazines. 
Gender identity is changing as rapidly as consumer goods change because those 
consumer goods are the available materials for fashioning a gendered self. 
Literature on consumer culture and marketing has argued that goods are marketed 
along gender lines for specific types of people (Simpson, 1994, Barthel, 1988, Clark, 
1993). Understood together with Butler and West and Zimmerman’s work on gender, the 
gender differentiation of consumer goods means that consumers who use goods to 
perform gender in ways that refer to established heteronormative categories will gain 
social status as competent social subjects. Butler further argues that, “the materialization 
of a given sex will centrally concern the regulation of identificatory practices such that 
the identification with the abjection of sex will be persistently disavowed” (Butler, 1993; 
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237).  Not only is it important to have and display the consumer goods associated with 
the gender an individual is performing, but it is also important to distance oneself from 
consumer goods associated with the other gender.  
Gender and Consumer Culture Literature 
 Although theoretical work on gender focuses on the ways in which gender is 
performed and displayed, there is little work that examines the consumer end of gender 
presentation. Consumers and consumer culture meet through ads and shopping:  both 
advertising and retail offer opportunities to construct the relationship of gender to 
commodities.  The literature on advertising and gender is important because, even though 
consumers may not be swayed by advertising, the meanings that ads attempt to attach to 
products are still available as referents. Among the early and highly influential works of 
this sort are Erving Goffman’s (1979) examination of gender in advertising in Gender 
Advertisements and Betty Friedan’s (1963) work in The Feminine Mystique on the 
influence of marketing in creating the ideal consuming woman.  
 Goffman argues that marketers use gender in advertisements to make the 
messages meaningful to viewers. Advertisers use highly stereotypical depictions of 
gender in order to make the messages that they are trying to get across about goods 
meaningful to a broad audience. This strategy implies that the meanings marketers 
attempt to attach to goods are also likely to be highly stereotypical in order to be broadly 
recognizable. In so much as this is the case, goods such as clothing, are not likely to stray 
far from fairly normative, broadly recognized understandings of femininity and 
masculinity.  
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 Betty Friedan analyzed documents written by and for marketers of household 
cleaning products and conducted interviews with those marketers. She writes, “In his own 
unabashed terms, this most helpful of the hidden persuaders showed the function served 
by keeping American women housewives – the reservoir that their lack of identity, lack 
of purpose, creates, to be manipulated into dollars at the point of purchase” (Friedan, 
1963; 27). Marketers sought to find and sell goods to women’s insecurities, guilt, and 
unhappiness. Admen (and they really were men at the time) encouraged one another to 
persuade women to develop a pattern of “happiness through things,” and an 
understanding that “the only way a young housewife was supposed to express herself, 
and not feel guilty about it, was in buying products for the home and family” (Friedan, 
1963; 38).  The underlying idea in Friedan’s analysis of “hidden persuaders” is that 
marketers wanted women to lack identity, satisfying creative outlets, confidence, and 
overall happiness so that consumer goods could be used to attempt to satisfy those lacks. 
Identity and personhood was meant to be tied to things a woman possessed, the ways she 
used them, and the reasons she bought them. Ads were used to tie gender and personhood 
to products.  
 Goffman and Friedan showed that gender was one of the primary themes along 
which marketers advertised products. While these works are over 30 years old the themes 
they identified are still present in social science work on gender and consumer culture. In 
his book Provocateur, Anthony Cortese built on Goffman’s work. He argues; “Ads try to 
tell us who we are and who we should be” (Cortese, 2004; 13). Cortese points out two 
important functions of gender in advertisements. “First, ads try to tell us that there is a big 
difference between appropriate behavior for men or boys and that for women or girls. 
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Second, advertising and other mass media reinforce the notion that men are dominant and 
that women are passive and subordinate” (Cortese, 2004; 13-14). William Leiss, Stephen 
Kline, and Sut Jhally also build on Goffman to show that ads rely on exaggerated 
displays of gender to ensure that their messages will be recognizable (Leiss, Kline, Jhally 
1997). They further argue that ads promise visions of well-being and self improvement 
(Leiss, Kline, Jhally 1997). Not only do ads display gender differences, they exaggerate 
and emphasize those differences. 
 Advertisements play an important role in gendering goods, creating markets for 
goods along gender lines, and providing the recognizable symbolic meaning for 
individuals to use goods to present themselves as gendered.  Trevor Millum, writing 
about advertising in women’s magazines, provides a top-down approach to thinking 
about the powerful relationship between advertisements, identity, and presentation. He  
identified advertising as means of social control, and argues that “institutions of social 
control guide the life of an individual by creating a new of idea of him [sic]- and 
encouraging him [sic] to conform as far as possible to that concept” (Millum, 1975; 22). 
Perhaps Millum’s research would be more powerfully applied to current consumer 
culture when read in the framework of Baudrillard’s work on the hyperreality of 
postmodernity. In Simulation and Simulacra, Baudrillard argues, “Simulation is no 
longer that of a territory, a referential being or a substance. It is the generation by models 
of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal” (Baudrillard, 1988; 1). In other words, the 
models of femininity and masculinity in magazine ads, such as those Millum studied, do 
not represent real men or women. The images in the ads are simulations of gender. They 
represent the most highly feminized or masculinized ideas. Rather than depicting “real” 
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men and women, ads depict “hyperreal” men and women; more masculine or feminine 
than any walking, talking, everyday person. They display distilled images of gender 
within which people can simultaneously see themselves and see themselves falling short. 
The ad gives its viewer the opportunity to identify with the image and see that they fall 
short of the hyperreal of the image while offering them a product to help them come close 
to achieving the unattainable image of gender.   
 Advertisers hope that ads lead to the purchase of goods, but goods are purchased 
by embodied people in social spaces that are organized for the selling of products. These 
retail spaces have the potential to influence the social construction of gender by patrons, 
but compared to the literature on advertising, there is much less literature on how stores 
themselves mobilize gender in the quest to maximize profit.  Stores are organized in the 
best ways marketers can devise to get consumers to part with their money, placing whole 
outfits or matching accessories close to each other so shoppers will be more likely to buy  
the whole set (Leach, 1993). In his book, Land of Desire, William Leach discusses the 
process by which department stores began organizing goods and laying out stores in 
order to get people to buy more goods. He explains that the introduction of escalators and 
elevators allowed merchandiser to put reliably high selling goods on second and third 
floors so that customers would need to walk deep into the store, past items they may 
purchase impulsively, to find the items they needed (Leach, 1993). He also explains that 
between 1921 and 1923 department stores started putting kindred goods together in 
adjacent departments. He writes, partly quoting a newspaper from 1921; “Women might 
visit the handbag and hosiery departments, which adjoined the women’s shoe section, ‘so 
that matching these items with the purchase of shoes is at once convenient and tempting’’ 
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(Leach, 1993; 318). The idea was to put goods that are used together adjacent to each 
other in stores which has translated into stores that are highly gender divided, with goods 
women wear all grouped together in one area, goods men wear all grouped together in 
another, with boy’s and girl’s clothes similarly sectioned off. The consumer marketplace 
became more of a gendering social force as ready made clothes became the norm and 
marketing grew increasingly savvy. 
 In his essay “Spaces for the Subject of Consumption,” Rob Shields argues; “In 
contemporary consumption sites, it is hypothesized that new modes of subjectivity (at 
least at the level of the person), interpersonal relationships (at the level of the small 
group) and models of social totality are being experimented with, ‘browsed through’ and 
‘tried on’ in much the same way that one might shop for clothes” (Shields, 1992; 15). He 
is indicating the ways consumers can experiment with putting on different personas and 
claiming membership in different subgroups or “tribes.” Even while consumer space does 
provide for many possibilities, that potential is limited by the items available for purchase 
and the symbolic meanings those items bear in the social world. While there may be 
“skateboard” or “goth” clothes, there are no “genderqueer” clothes; rather, there are 
“guys’ goth” clothes and “girls’ goth” clothes.  
 Literature on gender, advertisements, and retail is useful for understanding how 
goods become embedded with gendered meaning and how social actors may understand 
the use of consumer goods, however, this literature does little to address the embodied 
people who are using these goods to present a gendered self. This literature exposes the 
problem genderqueer identifying people may have with consumer goods. If products are 
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laden with stereotypes of traditional heterogender, using these goods may be difficult for 
those who reject gender as a personally meaningful distinguisher.  
There is little if any existing work that addresses the gender separation of the 
physical space in which consumer goods are purchased, the interactions and 
understandings that maintain that separation, and the experiences of people who chose 
not to limit their gender presentation to items found on only one side of the divide. The 
organization of the store into men’s and women’s sections reinforces the idea that gender 
is binary, and the threat of hassle, or interpersonal accountability for being in the “wrong” 
section shows that binary gender is reinforced and reproduced in the process of buying 
goods with which to present a gendered self. The gendered division of the physical space 
allows for people to be only masculine or feminine, and the threat of hassle or coercion 
reinforces the idea that people are always only one or the other. This gap in the literature 
is especially troubling because it goes from advertising gender to performing gender with 
little acknowledgment of the consumption process. Social science research seems to have 
failed to understand social actors primarily as consumers of socially meaningful goods 
that are worn on bodies even while examining the meanings of goods and the 
performance of gender. Similar to television characters who never use the bathroom 
social actors seem to perform gender without ever inhabiting, negotiating, and enacting 
gender in sex-marked consumer spaces.  
 Maintaining a connection between consumer goods, physical space of shopping, 
and gender performance reinforces the importance of American social actors identity as 
consumer and provides at least an inroad for connecting the global consequences of 
American consumption with everyday interactions. There is far more work to be done in 
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this area than can possibly be accomplished in one paper; however, the current research 
seeks to examine the ways in which genderqueer consumers negotiate an identity that is 
not understood as a possibility for identity in many interactions with gendered consumer 
goods that must be purchased in gendered spaces.  
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Chapter 3 
Methods 
Queer(ing) Social Science Research 
 Dorothy Smith argues for a sociology in which those who were the objects of 
study and social knowledge become “its subjects, its knowers” (Smith, 1999; 59). For me 
this means that I am not simply studying a group of people, rather I am working with 
individuals who claim membership to a group and we are attempting together to 
articulate how those people came to be in that group, and how they understand, navigate, 
and assign meaning to the environment that they confront in their lived experience. The 
conditions I wish to study have real consequences for real people; rather than writing in 
an abstract way that seemingly takes itself to be value free I must acknowledge that I am 
taking a moral side.  
 I could get around some of the problems of social science research described by 
Smith by theorizing myself, in other words, by writing an autoethnography in which I not 
only acknowledge that I can only know from my own perspective but I also write only 
from my perspective. If I were to do this I would not be able show how others understand 
and use the concept genderqueer. Even though my attempt to give text to the experiences 
of others is exactly the act that Smith argues takes power away from them, without such 
work this group would be even more powerless as their struggles would not even be 
considered. In this way I can both try to show the problems this group faces and push for 
 39
solutions. Though I do include some autoethnographic material to both situate myself in 
and show my connection to my research, I want to be able to show that there are a 
number of people struggling and coming up with creative solutions to the problems of 
negotiating consumer goods and binary gender assumptions. Even though I am not 
writing an autoethnography, my work, like any research, should be understood as one 
analysis and one set of writing from the particular perspective of one situated knower. 
Many examinations of knowledge point out that all knowledge is produced by socially 
located people. To borrow from Donna Haraway, the goal of academic work should be 
situated knowledges, or information known by different people based on their specific 
social and temporal location. My work then is reflective of my situated knowledge.  
 Dorothy Smith’s critique of social science literature is from a feminist 
perspective; in addition to the feminist ethical problems that Smith pointed out there are 
also components of social science research models that are odds with queer theory. In 
2005, Stephen Valocchi called for the use of Queer Theory in social science research. He 
argues that the dominant identity categories used in sociology, especially as they relate to 
sex, gender, sex category, and sexuality do not do enough to capture the complexities of 
identity and desire in people’s lives (Valocchi, 2005). He points out four projects in 
which sociologists were able to successfully embrace queer theory in their work, but were 
not able to fully get out of the limitations placed on them by the social science research 
model (Valocchi, 2005).  
 There is one particular element of social science research that is particularly 
difficult to balance with Queer Theory: identifying a population. The very idea of 
identifying a population to study implies that a group of people will be identified based 
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on something they all have in common, setting up a dichotomy between that group and 
everyone not included in that group. Queer theory works to break down dichotomies, blur 
boundaries, and illuminate the role of language in stabilizing and reproducing normative 
social structures. It highlights the play and contradiction of power and the intersection of 
identities. Most importantly, it defies definition, collapses categorization, and 
simultaneously speaks to similarity and difference while problematizing the two concepts 
as yet another dualism to be deconstructed. Even in the simple act of calling a group into 
being by naming them along the lines of some characteristic, the researcher has reified 
them as a group with an identity to be studied. The big problem for Queer research is that 
research cannot be done without decisions about who to include and who to exclude.  
 The idea that a group of people form a population to be studied does not sit well 
with my feminist beliefs about the potential for researchers to claim power over the 
people with whom they are studying. By naming the people involved in the research the 
researcher claims power and takes it away from the people being named. Feminist 
sociologists have found ways around some of these problems of power, such as referring 
to the people involved as narrators or co-researchers and using their words to describe 
group members. Still the researcher or in some cases, student of social life, has still made 
the initial decision of who is included in the group.  
 Genderqueer is a boundary blurring, deconstruction project; for this reason, I 
cannot find people who share a set of common practices as is the social science model for 
work on subcultural groups. Like many identity labels, I cannot presume to know exactly 
what the word means to everyone who adopts it, but since genderqueer is more of a 
conceptual critique of gender labels than a label itself, I also cannot presume that people 
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identify as genderqueer and present their gender ambiguously. I could not go out and pick 
the genderqueer folks off the street because I do not presume to know what this 
identification means to people and how or if they choose to display it.  Coming up with a 
solution for the problem of a population was extremely challenging, and in the end was 
the result of a suggestion of one of my advisors. Rather than identifying individuals who 
identify with queering gender, I found a community that had already identified 
themselves as genderqueer. This community is an on-line blogging community. Since 
this community is on-line, I cannot talk about what people do, only about what they say 
they do. This project is not an analysis of these people so much as an analysis of how 
they actively construct, or talk about, themselves on-line. Taking this on-line community 
as my sample allows me to remain more or less true to the queer theory framework and 
still find people to work with. 
Accessing Genderqueer Folk On-Line 
 Judith/Jack Halberstam presents components of the dilemma of doing queer 
research in Female Masculinity. She argues that “A queer methodology, in a way, is a 
scavenger methodology that uses different methods to produce information on subjects 
who have been deliberately or accidentally excluded from traditional studies of human 
behavior” (Halberstam, 1998; 13). My approach is a sort of methodological chimera, 
using the Internet to put together something between interviews and a focus group and 
sometimes including myself as a participant and sometimes as an autoethnographer.  
 To start, I needed to find a place where people had already declared their 
identification with genderqueer. Many organizations centered around non-heterosexuality 
at least discursively include “queer” as a population to serve, but the everyday use of the 
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word queer often does not refer to gender. In order to find a group of people who self-
identified with genderqueer at least conceptually, I turned to the Internet community that 
had in large part inspired this research project. While Internet research is on the rise it is 
still not well developed in the social sciences, but the Internet provided me with a way to 
find informants without relying on my perceptions and connections.  The community is 
called “genderqueer” and the community managers describe it as follows; “This 
community is for those of us who don't feel we fit the binary gender system in use by most 
of society. Ungendered, many gendered, a gender other than the one society thinks you 
should be? Do you express your gender(s) in nontraditional ways? You just might fit in 
here!” Currently the community has 1900 members, who are allowed to post and respond 
to other posts and 1400 “watchers,” who can read posts but cannot make posts and 
responses themselves. 
 In setting up my research I had two technical problems to overcome. First, I 
would be working with people all over the country, so face-to-face interactions were not 
an option, and second, I needed to make sure everyone involved went through the 
informed consent process. I set up my own blogging community where I could control 
who was able to view the discussion and invited members of the “genderqueer” 
community to join and to give their informed consent if they wished to participate. The 
result was similar to a focus group, or more appropriately, a “virtual focus group.” Nine 
people joined the discussion group from the beginning, and 2 more joined in response to 
a later, second invitation. Every week for 8 weeks I posted discussion questions to which 
the community responded. Members were able to respond both to my questions and each 
other’s responses, an option they used only occasionally. 
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  I posted a description of my research project and asked people to join a new 
blogging community that I set up for the expressed purpose of research. In the process I 
explained my goals in doing this particular project and why I felt it necessary to find 
people in that particular Internet community to participate. Anyone who was a member of 
that community and over 18 was encouraged to participate; unfortunately several 
community members who were under 18 had to be turned away due to IRB restrictions. I 
regret that this research could not include younger members because it would have added 
to the diversity of the group. Sunday evenings for 8 weeks I posted discussion questions 
for the group. Participation the first two weeks was considerably higher than later in the 
study. For the first two weeks many members made multiple posts and all the members 
participated. As the study progressed some members did not respond to every question 
and few left comments on other members’ responses. 
 Throughout the 8 weeks I occasionally posted questions or comments to group 
members’ responses, but I did not find that these comments elicited much response. At 
times I took myself as a participant and at times stepped back in the more traditional 
position of researcher as observer and I include sections of autoethnography along with 
my analysis. There were several weeks where I provided one of the answers to my own 
discussion question because I wanted to democratize the research process and because it 
seemed appropriate to give group members information about myself if I expected them 
to give the same information to me. My responses to the discussion questions are not 
included in my findings. In writing my findings I gave group members new pseudonyms 
to ensure confidentiality.  
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Chapter 4 
Findings 
 Group members where asked to respond to questions asking about how they 
understand gender, how they came to question gender, what they wear when they are 
comfortable or uncomfortable with their environment, where they shop, and how they 
deal with overtly gendered consumer goods. The first few weeks focused on gender 
identity, two weeks in the middle focused on intersections of identity and on-line 
communities, and the last few weeks focused on shopping and consumer goods, 
specifically clothes and body products. Some questions provoked a good deal of 
agreement, while others resulted in a variety of divergent responses. Since these 
responses were provided on-line they should be understood as self-reports of practices 
and attitudes with no way to make sure the reports are accurate. Even if the responses 
deviate in certain ways from practices, they still shed light on how individuals describe 
their genderqueer identification and use of gendered consumer goods. Group members 
had ample time to formulate responses; there is no way to know how much time 
individual members spent preparing responses, but many are quite sophisticated in their 
content, though spelling and punctuation suffered in the ways common to Internet 
communication.  
 I did not ask questions about group members’ biological sex as that would have 
gone against my queer framework, but most offered the information in some form or 
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another. Most were female-bodied and that played into how they understood and wrote 
about needing to use things like tampons and razors or modifying their bodies. There was 
one group member who is an MTF transsexual and one group member started their first 
post by declaring that they posses XY chromosomes. 
 There was remarkable consistency in the ways group members wrote about 
coming to question gender expectations. This question was important because it both 
gave me a sense of who the group members were and allowed me to see if in fact the only 
way to arrive at queer(ing) gender is by reading Queer Theory as I had. Many reported 
not ever fully understanding themselves as boys or girls or conforming to norms for 
people of their sex category but most did not give their non-conformity great 
consideration until later in life. They described moments or occasions when they realized 
that binary gender was not the only option. Lending support to Ian Hacking’s argument 
about possibilities for personhood, members of this group seemed to find that there are 
possibilities for personhood beyond binary gender, even if they are difficult to explain.  
They exercised their autonomy in constructing their own personal response to the 
heterogender binary, even if there was no social or authoritative affirmation of this choice 
to mark it as within the realm of possibility. 
ColorfulMissive: 
“I never quite conformed to standard gender roles. I remember being very pleased when, 
at the age of 5, my cousin (of around the same age) thought that I was a boy. (I'm 
biofemale.) But for a very long time the fact that I was different seemed irrelevant. I've 
always been a little reclusive and just all around odd, so being not gender normative was 
just one more eccentricity among many. It took me until I was around twenty to realize 
that gender *was* relevant.” 
 
HardCandy: 
“All through out middle school i though "hey all the other guys are doing this and that", 
being bio female. I never though anything of it until my teacher and everyone in the room 
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cornered me saying. "why do you dress and act like a little boy?". "Because i can." was 
the response but they gave me a bunch of sermens(sp?)about how it was suppose to be. 
And i guess it scared me back into a "femmine" role, cause i never thought about it being 
a problem.” 
 
SurpiseChicken: 
“all i knew was that i wasn't a boy, but the girl thing wasn't working either. i didn't really 
think about it till high school, when i started learning that there were other people like 
me, who also didn't quite fit gender norms... until then, i was just a tomboy, and that was 
generally ok with me.” 
 
Those who did give consideration to their gender non-conformity expressed feeling as 
though something was off but they did not have the words or resources to understand 
what until they were adults. 
 One respondent described a particular childhood instance of trying to understand 
what it meant to act like a girl:  
Superhero_Hampster 
“Well one day I took out every peice of pink, girly clothing I had and put it on, telling 
myself that it was my favorite color and that I was going to pretend I was a fairy princess 
and I was going to giggle and do girl things.. and then maybe I'd understand what it was 
like to be a girl because at the time I just wasn't getting it. . . I know now I was 
questioning gender and more specifically questioning how other people were able to be 
'girls'. . . But at the time I didn't have the words I needed to describe that curiosity or to 
express it, so it became an impossible challange that plagued me many times over the 
years. It took until I was Twenty-one to get everything I needed to really put the peices 
together, which was the longest wait of my life thus far.” 
 
 There was a general theme of locating gender someplace other than on or in 
bodies or disregarding it as an unnecessary part of identity. At some point every 
respondent voiced some kind of frustration about expectations made of them based on 
their appearance. 
ColorfulMissive 
“. . . society was going to assign me a gender (based on my physical appearance) 
whether I wanted it or not.” 
 
SurpiseChicken 
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“the way i think about my gender is not at all influenced by my appearance. 
my appearance is my sex. my gender has nothing to do with my body. it's my mind.” 
 
 
MyDiary 
“It is just simpler to let people think that I am what they see. So I suck it up and just let 
everybody assume that the appearance they see is the way that I identify. This is what 
makes it tempting to want to transition. Yet, I know deep inside that I would be no 
happier living as a man!” 
 
HardCandy 
“I've never been one to pay too much attention to my appearance, so for me my gender's 
always been an internal thing, based more on how I feel than anything else.” 
 
DebraDay 
“Do I have gender, sitting alone and still, naked in a dark room? I have identity, but I 
don't think it's anything firm and definite enough to call gender, the way most people use 
that term.” 
 
 Some respondents connected the frustration they felt to being accountable as 
either hetero-male or hetero-female since their biology did not parallel their genderqueer 
identity. Some respondents claimed “genderqueer” as an identity they inhabit, a finding 
that shows that some of them have not been exposed to academic Queer Theory although 
they have been influence by it, while others took an approach that was more queer 
theoretical and saw gender as something other people care about and apply to them 
despite their wishes. No matter which perspective respondents took they consistently 
expressed a frustration with understanding their gender in a way that was not identifiable 
to others since most others saw them only as instances of male or female sex category 
and held them accountable for masculine or feminine heterogender accordingly. 
 Some expressed a temporal fluidity with their feelings of gender, allowing these 
feelings to shift quite frequently throughout the week, even throughout a day:  they may 
feel “male” at one moment and “female” the next. A gender image that might feel 
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comfortable in the morning might no longer feel comfortable as the day progresses and 
their social context shifts.  Some expressed feeling more confident when their appearance 
more closely matched the way they felt gender at the time, while others felt that even if 
they could present themselves in a way that matched their gender others would not 
recognize their gender identity anyway. It may be that those who described their 
experience of themselves as shifting between male and female were using sex as a proxy 
for gender or it maybe that they did not have other language available to them, but the use 
of these words indicate that they are very much driven by the heterogender system even 
as they try to work against it. 
SurpriseChicken 
“the fact that my gender identity will not be recognized by mainstream society during my 
lifetime does not affect my gender. i will never appear to a stranger to be what i really 
am, and i cannot let that hurt me. i will not appear to anyone to be genderqueer. that is 
just something i have to come to terms with. i am not an androgynous looking person. 
that does not invalidate the fact that i feel genderqueer.” 
 
Superhero_Hampster 
“How do you use clothes to project a gender the rest of society won't even try to 
recognize?” 
 
trhop 
I find that I feel more confident, more like myself, when I dress in more "male" clothes. 
 
Moraldiy 
“I personally perfer male chothling, and i find that it helps me feel confident in my 
identiy but does not change my feelings” 
 
RockingSpring 
“My appearance isn't relevant as much to how I think about my gender, as how I feel 
about my gender. I almost always feel better about myself the more my appearance 
matches however my gender is feeling that day. When, for whatever reason, I can't 
express the gender I want through my appearance, I tend to just end up a more frustrated 
person.” 
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 Stone (1962) and Berger and Luckmann (1967) would have predicted that when 
confronted with dissonance, group members would revise their identity, their appearance, 
or their interpretations of interactions with others. In many instances group members 
voiced degrees of ambivalence about their identity and the way others treat them. They 
sometimes described wanting others to treat them as they understood themselves and 
sometimes dismissed appearance altogether to affirm that identity does not reside on their 
bodies. This ambivalence came out in responses to questions about how they understand 
gender and how relevant gender is to their appearance.  
 Questions about clothes and body products revealed several strategies and 
attitudes for dealing with the potential for tension between appearance, consumer goods, 
and genderqueer identification. It may be significant that descriptions of comfortable 
clothing and strategies for appearing gendered in particular ways were offered even when 
my questions were specifically about gender identity and not about clothes at all. 
Respondents often wrote about both clothing and identity even when my questions were 
about one or the other. Clothing and appearance seem to be intricately related to identity 
even when respondents do not locate identity on or in bodies. Furthermore, many 
respondents also reported dressing in ways that they understand to be relatively gender 
neutral (even as one member acknowledge that gender neutral mostly meant defaulting to 
masculine dress), wearing things like jeans and t-shirts or big sweatshirts as opposed to 
skirts or clothes that display sexualized body parts. There were also some who explained 
that they feel more confident and comfortable in clothes gendered to match the sex 
category to which they do not belong and they use clothes to cover curves and hide 
breasts.  
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trhop 
“At the moment, my favorite outfit is: Gap Men's Straight Leg jeans that hide my hips 
*VERY* well, Abercrombie and Fitch sweater, Gap t-shirt.  
Although I love suit jackets/collared shirts/ties as well.  
But I do dress more androgynously, i.e., more femininely, when I fear for my safety” 
 
 
 
SurpriseChicken 
“i can't dress femme. my gender switches from one end of the spectrum to the other, and 
while when i'm a girl i feel comfortable in jeans still, i do not feel comfortable when i'm a 
dude stuck in a skirt. working on maybe fixing that... doing what i can. 
so yeah. i mostly wear masculine clothes. guy jeans, maybe a girl shirt, but pretty much 
i'm always in jeans and a tshirt. acceptable attire for either sex...” 
 
DebraDay 
“If I'm going someplace I feel safe, I kind of pick a theme; otherwise I prefer to totally 
cover up: long sleeves, jacket if it's cool enough, hat, and so on. I admit to being 
somewhat baffled by the way people react to me.” 
 
 At least one person did not seem to take meanings embedded in clothing too seriously. 
 
Wanting_for_Nothing 
“If I am getting dressed up in a dress or something tight for a show, it makes me feel 
vulnerable when I am walking around the street at night, it makes me feel like I am more 
of a target. I like to walk around with a hood on and jeans. If I am hanging out with my 
close friends, I will wear the most ridiculous shit I can find, revealing, atrocious, 
embarrassing, useless, it doesn't matter.” 
 
 The people in my group could be characterized as possessing one of several 
attitudes toward appearance, interaction, and identity. Some were frustrated that others 
would not understand their identity from their appearance and looked for other kinds of 
support. Others derived confidence from appearing in ways that matched expectations for 
the gender they most felt at the moment, which for some was fairly consistent and for 
others may change throughout the course of a single day. Still others seemed to step back 
from gender altogether, recognize that it is significant for most of society but not for them 
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personally and try to do what makes them comfortable, understanding that things like 
clothes and razors are embedded with gendered meanings that they cannot escape. 
  The activity of shopping presented more or less of a challenge for people with 
different attitudes, but no one expressed a real enthusiasm for fashion or a passion for 
shopping. Some respondents had devised shopping strategies to avoid confrontational 
interactions with sales associates or other shoppers while others described feeling 
detached and/or alienated from the activity of shopping and the wardrobe it produced. 
Others seemed less concerned with gendering of the clothes or the space the clothes came 
from they just wanted to find clothes that are comfortable and inexpensive and worried 
less about the gendered meaning of the items they purchased.  
 One strategy members reported using while shopping for clothes is finding stores 
that have both men’s and women’s sections that can be easily crossed.  
SurpriseChicken 
“i shop where the mens and womens departments tend to be close or kinda blended 
together (thrift stores or goodwill for example) or places where people don't really care 
or give you crap for being in the 'wrong' place, like walmart or sears.” 
 
HardCandy 
“For the most part the places that I frequent sell both girls and guys clothes so I can 
easily try either on. I'm actually very lucky because in my local H&M and a couple of the 
other places where I shop most often they have never made an issue of my trying on guys 
clothes even if I go in there when I'm having a feminine day so I'm in a skirt, or 
whatever.” 
 
Another member described shopping with female relatives who seemed to be more 
engaged in the process. Rather than looking for fashionable clothes, this particular person 
looked for clothes that would be comfortable and not fall apart, a theme that was repeated 
by several community members.  
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Superhero_Hampster 
“I shop wherever it is I get dragged to, sometimes JCPenny but I'm not above digging 
through secondhand clothes for something that fits. . .There aren't many places I do like 
to shop for clothes, I just like places that don't cater to the assumption that everyone who 
shops there is ultra femme(and those are hard to find).” 
 
Not everyone was concerned with being held accountable for being out of place in men’s 
or women’s sections of stores. Two community members reported simply buying what 
they like or what was inexpensive and worrying less about the gender it was intended to 
reflect. Shopping on-line was another strategy that a community member reported using.  
 Consumer goods other than clothes seemed to provoke similar strategies from 
respondents, but not always the same strategies from the same people. The community 
was asked how they deal with “tension between your identity and the available consumer 
goods such as clothes, make-up, and accessories that are often clearly gendered.”  
Wanting_for_Nothing 
“I just deal with it. The color of a razor doesn't faze me, I'll grab whatever is there, as 
long as it's cheap, I think it is funny that the razors are colored "accordingly" but it 
doesn't bother me.” 
 
RockingSpring 
“I tend to just buy what I like, without as much paying attention to what gender it is 
intended for. Unless I'm looking for a particular gender presentation, then I pay more 
attention.” 
 
HardCandy 
“I honestly don't find that there is that much tension between my identity and everything 
else. I couldn't tell you why, I don't do anything to minimize it, it just doesn't seem to be 
an issue. It may be because I don't actively think one way or the other, I just do things my 
way without thinking about, or making an issue of it either way.” 
 
SuperHero_Hampster 
“With the necessities, pads and things, I grit my teeth and go for it. My bodily functions 
need to be taken care of after all, no shame in that. But deoderant? I have two. . . With 
things like razors, I'll usually buy the 'male' one. This last time I got pink because my 
sisters BF lives with us and uses the same brand I do, so I got the pink one because it 
would be harder to get them confused. I'll normally pick out the 'gendered' item that is 
darker colored, because I just like those colors better.” 
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These informants seem to have been making decisions about which products to use based 
on criteria other than the gendering of the product. Products that cannot be understood as 
anything but intended for females such as “pads and things” seemed to present more of a 
problem. They are conscious of the sex marking of the products, but most did not express 
difficulty or tension when using products intended for either gender; only one community 
member expressed experiencing significant difficulty with overtly gendered products for 
the body. 
 
SurpriseChicken 
“once i tried to get a male razor. even the disposable ones are gendered. the 'female' 
ones were pink and the 'male' ones were blue. no nongendered yellow ones... but i didn't 
want my family freaking out on me... and i don't really wanna get rid of my peach fuzz 
with a pink razor. *shrug* so i didn't. i just don't buy things. . . either i grit my teeth and 
wanna cry and just get it done with (deodorant, pads/tampons, shampoo, goddamn bras) 
or i don't buy it at all (shaving products, hair gel, hats, backpacks, coats and jackets...) 
or i default over to the male crap.” 
 
 The members of my research community described several ways people live with 
an identity that is not available to be occupied in most social situations. Not surprisingly, 
they described moments of tension, discomfort, and frustration around not being treated 
as non-gendered, but they recognized that most of society understands sex and gender as 
connected. Putting together a “program of appearance,” to use Stone’s term, was 
important across the board, but the degree to which community members felt challenged 
by the reviews of others varied. They acknowledged that they had to use consumer goods 
and those consumer goods are gendered and sold in gendered spaces, but this knowledge 
did not have the same impact on their reports of how or where people shopped or what 
they bought and used. Some community members were conscious of the space and the 
 54
gendering of products and did things to avoid confrontation and mismatch between the 
products and their identities, while others seemed to view the gendering of everything as 
silly and choose their clothes and body products based on price or comfort flowing 
between sections of stores and gendering of goods easily. Interestingly, and quite 
contrary to the expectations of many when I began this project, many of my community 
members reported learning about “genderqueer” identity from on-line communities and 
media or social events but none reported coming to identify with queering gender or 
“genderqueer” by reading Queer Theory and taking college classes. This finding is 
significant for several reasons. First, it means that some versions of ideas from Queer 
Theory are making their way out of academia. Second, the slips that many community 
members made between words referring to gender and words referring to sex suggests 
that they are not always differentiating between sex and gender, or it also may be that 
since they did not learn these ideas in a classroom, they do not have the language to talk 
about them any other way. Third, some of them let sex/gender drive their expression; 
describing actions they take when they feel or want to feel “male” or “female.” These 
findings indicate that some of the group members did not understand queer in the way it 
is used in Queer Theory, but they were still dealing with very real problems and using 
some variations of ideas from queer theory. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Discussion and Conclusions  
 The remarks from this group of genderqueer identifying people show the 
importance of the act of shopping and the practical use of consumer goods for shaping 
and inhabiting gendered bodies. Furthermore, the comments of the group show tension 
and ambivalence about gender, identity, and appearance, but only some of them 
described working on “programs of appearance” that would be reviewed to match their 
identity. Some had given up on the hope that their genderqueer identity might be readable 
from their appearance and movement.  The identities described by my informants did, as 
queer(ing) gender identity would imply, seem to be in flux or at play. They were aware of 
the social expectations of consistent, clearly gendered presentation and behavior to match 
sex category, but they described using that knowledge sometimes to perform gender 
however they wanted at the moment. For some respondents gender performance was 
consistently masculine or feminine or what they understood to be androgynous while 
others described feeling a shift from one to another. No one in my virtual focus group 
claimed that they felt comfortable with either binary gender label. 
 Even though the group was small, they showed considerable diversity in how they 
talked about self-fashioning and using consumer goods. This research shows that there 
are multiple ways of understanding and moving through the world while identifying with 
queer(ing) gender. The people I worked with described different strategies for dealing 
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with possible points of tension, but they all seemed to understand that they would not be 
recognized by others as “genderqueer.” For some group members not being recognized 
was more of a problem than it seemed to be for others. They understood clothes and body 
products to have meanings and they used these products to produce appearances that are 
understood as gendered to others but that knowledge was not equally important to all 
group members.  
 Their responses indicated that the space and proximity of men’s and women’s 
clothes and the social class of store clients are factors in how they decide where to shop. 
Also, the responses indicate that my informants simultaneously worked with knowledge 
about the gendered symbolic meaning of goods and an understanding that the differences 
between the goods were more about form (and the sex category marking of the product) 
than the function of the product. One respondent mentioned using “men’s” deodorant to 
get “male” energy, and another reported that they do not consider the gendering of items 
they typically use “Unless I'm looking for a particular gender presentation, then I pay 
more attention.” These informants understood goods to be gendered, and would 
sometimes use them to present gender to others or affirm it for themselves, but also did 
not seem to take the sex marking of products as the most significant factor in their 
decision to buy and use a product. 
 It may be that tension between consumer goods and gender identity was only felt 
by those who were most influenced by the construction of gender through advertising and 
the gendering of retail spaces. It may also be that those who did not feel uncomfortable 
with gendered consumer goods saw the whole production of clothing and body products 
as gender as a sort of ironic joke that they could play with, presenting themselves as 
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hetero-masculine using one set of props, hetero-feminine with another set of props, or 
anything else they could imagine with the right combination of consumer goods. Without 
further research it would not be possible to tell which, if either of these situations is the 
case.  However, my research does show that this group does understand clothing and 
body products as both a way to present their identity (even though they had no hope that 
others would recognize it) and a way to put on or take off identities. They did not 
describe their experience as quite so fluid as putting on woman and taking off man. They 
seemed to understand their bodies and recognition of identity by others as important but 
they did not seem to see identity as fixed or given.  
 Put in the context of narrative identity genderqueer is tricky to describe. The 
stories of my group members fall in line with each other only up to the point of 
discovering other possibilities for identity that do not rely on male/female binary and 
finding other people with similar perspectives through movies, glbtq activities, or on-line 
communities. They also generally felt some frustration about genderqueer not being 
recognizable, but that is where the stories stop lining up. Some group members wrote 
about considering modifying their bodies and taking on identity projects to reduce the 
frustration they felt about not being recognized as genderqueer. These particular people 
understood themselves to be becoming something else. Other group members seemed 
more or less unconcerned with the perception others have of their identity, unless that 
perception may put them in physical danger. There seems to be a fairly consistent 
“formula story” until discovering that there are possibilities for personhood beyond 
heterogender binary, and after that the stories diverge. It is interesting that a formula story 
seems to exist that describes the discovery of the repressiveness of the heterogender 
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binary, but that there is no single formula for how to deal with this discovery in one’s 
life.  Perhaps this reflects the presence of elements of Queer Theory in the everyday lives 
of these individuals:  formulaic identities are problematic, that is one lesson learned.  This 
finding indicates that the potential for queer activism that Butler wrote about is present in 
the everyday lives of social actors.  
 In her new book Undoing Gender, Butler writes:  
In the same way that queer theory opposes those who would regulate 
identities or establish epistemological claims of priority for those who 
make claims to certain kinds of identities, it seeks not only to expand the 
community base of antihomophobic activism, but, rather, to insist that 
sexuality is not easily summarized or unified through categorization. It 
does not follow, therefore, that queer theory would oppose all gender 
assignment . (2004; 7).  
 
Queer Theory does not insist on abandoning gender as a concept for everyone, but rather 
it holds that gender, sex, and sexuality are complex and that identities are not fixed, 
especially not by biological sex. If one goal of Queer Theory is to expand 
antihomophobic activism, then these stories of coming to see sex as complex, gender as 
fluid and constructed, and sexuality as difficult to describe or define show that Queer 
Theory is in fact making inroads into activism beyond college classrooms. Throughout 
this whole study I was the only person to narrate myself coming to identify with 
queer(ing) gender as a result of reading academic work on Queer Theory.  
 This study shows that Queer Theory is not just an academic phenomenon and 
queer activism is more than a possibility: it’s actually happening. That does not mean that 
queer(ing) identity is easy, unproblematic, or always effective in deconstructing the 
heterogender binary. The biggest problem facing my virtual focus group, aside from the 
homophobia that Queer Theory is meant to tackle, is that they are not recognized as 
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genderqueer. Queer(ing) gender is a possibility for personhood only in some contexts, 
such as specific Internet communities like the one I used in my research and with groups 
of like minded people.  
 I have argued throughout this thesis that consumer items, specifically clothes and 
body products are one of the key obstacles that stand in the way of  queer(ing) gender 
identity as a possibility for personhood.  The physical landscapes in which goods are 
purchased and the meanings associated with using those goods are important for the 
production of gendered bodies. For the people in my discussion group the physical space 
created by this grouping of goods causes them discomfort and fear of confrontation. The 
only person to even mention shopping in stores solely for women brought up the issue 
only to explain how distasteful they find such stores to be. Most informants made 
reference to shopping in stores that have both departments while they specifically noted 
looking for stores where they will not be hassled for the items they buy or the section in 
which they shop.  
 The people involved in this study show that not everyone completely “buys” into 
binary heterogender, but the alienation many of them described when confronted by 
goods like pink razors and women’s deodorant does inhibit some purchases. If queer (not 
queer(ing) gender identity) gender identity became a recognized segment of the market, 
marketers would likely revise, revision, and rearrange marketing strategies and some 
store layouts to reach these alienated consumers. At the same time though, group 
members discussed trying on men’s clothes but having feminine days and using men’s 
deodorant to get “male energy” on some days and women’s deodorant other days. This 
suggests that genderqueer identified people sometimes like to purchase products 
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associated with a particular gender.  Perhaps the most intelligent response from 
marketing would be market both men’s and women’s products to the same consumer. 
People would be encouraged to purchase clothes for “male days” and “female days” and 
“in-between days.” Gender fluid consumers may have multiple wardrobes to reflect their 
ever changing moods, requiring the purchase of more and more consumer goods. In so 
much as this may lead to the dissolution of gender categories, it would reflect the goals of 
queer activisms; however it would also lead to even greater divides in access to goods 
and strengthening of the capitalist market that privileges and rewards some at the cost of 
oppressing others. A gender revolution reliant on consumer goods may reflect the 
complex interplay of privileged and oppressed identities at work in and against social 
actors.  
 In her 2003 book The Commercialization of Intimate Life, Arlie Hochschild made 
an analogy: “Feminism is to the commercial spirit of intimate life as Protestantism is to 
the spirit of capitalism” (Hochschild, 2003; 23). She was suggesting that the spirit of 
women’s liberation and personal autonomy got women out of homes and into the work 
place but that the Marxist critiques of the worth of domestic labor that had been 
important in feminism were forgotten by the commercial world. The result of reducing 
feminism to images of women’s liberation and personal autonomy was that the capitalist 
market was able make moves into the domestic arena. The labor of intimate life has not 
become egalitarian; it has been commercialized. Rather than men and women sharing 
responsibility for childcare, food preparation, and housecleaning these tasks are being 
increasingly hired out to for-profit companies commercializing the domestic sphere. 
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While feminism has led to measurable advances for women’s equality is has also lead to 
measurable increases in the capitalist marketplace. 
  If queer(ing) identity were taken up by rational capitalism it would likely be 
mined of the Queer Theory behind it and instead it would become a third gender with 
clear boundaries. It would no longer be queer(ing) identity; (as I have been careful to 
write implying process and movement) it would become a queer gender. There may even 
become a third section of stores located smack in the middle with the men’s department 
on one side and the women’s department on the other containing items like binders, pre-
filled bras, stick-on facial hair, and wigs . The whole meaning of Queer Theory would be 
lost as marketers scrambled to put together ads with slogans such as “Think Outside the 
box. Don’t limit yourself to girl’s/guy’s shirts” or “Gender rules aren’t Your Rules” or 
“Gap Binders, Free To Be Bound.” Already companies like The Gap and Old Navy 
market “boy-cut” and “boyfriend” pants.  
 There is certainly potential for this kind of marketing to advance some of the 
goals of antihomophobic activism, but the idea of identity in process and critique will be 
lost as the message gets simplified to encourage consumers to buy both men’s and 
women’s products. Binary heterogender may not be disrupted just adjusted as consumers 
are encouraged to “buy both” and not encouraged to question why there are only two in 
the first place. Gender may get dislodged a bit from sex category but the idea that there 
can be only two genders because there can be only two sexes is not likely to be 
questioned.  
 Queer(ing) gender identity has the potential for the kind of antihomophobic 
activism that Butler wrote about even if practitioners do not read Queer Theory. The 
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people in my group were living with ambiguity and complexity even though they did not 
use academic Queer Theory, but they struggled with the knowledge that their identity 
would not be recognized. Drawing from the arguments that Hacking (1986) and Loseke 
(forthcoming) make about identity and the problems the people in my group described 
facing, it would seem that personal, autonomous identity may become more secure as it is 
recognized by larger institutions, collectives, and authorities. Herein lies quite a dilemma; 
if “queer” were to be recognized as a possibility for personhood, it would become one of 
the many possible ways to narrate identity a formula story. Stories that follow the 
formula for narrating “queer” would be recognized; but from a Queer Theory perspective 
the story can only have a formula up to a certain point before narrating “queer” begins to 
limit how queer can be understood and what it can be used to do. Furthermore, as soon as 
this possibility for identity gets taken up as an identity category by the rational capitalist 
marketing machine, the possibilities may become even more limited if not devoid of 
meaning completely.  
 The opposition in Queer Theory to taking a direct stand for or against any 
potential ethical issue makes arguing for or against the creation of a new queer subject 
position by the capitalist marketing machine difficult. Perhaps the best way to move 
forward in both queering gender and giving viable, recognizable subjectivity to queer 
identified people is to start to focus specifically on what queering consumption might 
look like. If there can be any kind of queering gender or sexuality outside of academia 
and small groups of people either frustrated by or indifferent to others’ treatment of them, 
then the action of queering gender and/or sexuality will need to be recognizable on a 
broad social scale. I do not wish to argue by any means that this needs or even ought to 
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be done by people who claim a queer identity (making their “queerness” suspect in the 
academic sense), but it does need to be recognizable as disruptive and agentic rather than 
deviant and problematic. If change is going to be made the problem of accountability for 
heteromormative sex categories will need to be overcome. Sara Crawley (2002) argues 
that “we must begin to read (the gender and sexual identities of) others as they choose to 
be read if we hope to deconstruct rigid, dichotomous notions of gender and sexuality” 
(Crawley, 2002; 23). Perhaps recognizing people’s choice in constructing a genderqueer 
identity is a good step toward destabilizing heteronormative binary gender. Furthermore, 
if queering gender is going to be made recognizable outside of the already established, 
vastly powerful capitalist machine, work needs to be done before the opportunity to 
market wardrobes of every imaginable identity to every consumer is exploited by the ever 
growing consumer marketplace. 
 This recognition may make living in the world easier for some social actors, but 
the implications for the goals of Queer Theory are a bit grim. I would argue that the 
conflict between individuals wanting to be recognized and recognition threatening the 
possibilities for queer activism is a conflict that ought to be acknowledged and worked 
from not against. Gayatri Spivak (1989) calls for “strategic essentialism” where identities 
and categories can be claimed and abandoned based on their political effectiveness in any 
given situation. Claiming a genderqueer identity does not accomplish all of the goals of 
Queer Theory, it especially does not deconstruct identity categories, but it does at least 
blur heterogender boundaries and destabilize the heterogender binary. Further demeaning 
people whose gender expression is not “queer enough” or queer in the right way because 
it is not as theoretically informed and linguistically sophisticated as academic writing 
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would only confirm the critiques of Queer Theory as elitist and hardly seems like a 
positive step toward ending oppression. I think it is possible that the kind of “pop queer 
identity” described by some group members may be particularly effective in some 
contexts with some audiences to accomplish some goals where the more academic 
constructions of identity may be more helpful in other situations to accomplish slightly 
different tasks. The potential problems that may arise from this conflict need not lead to a 
further conflict over which position is the most politically efficacious. I would argue 
instead that the multiple sides of this conflict ought to be held in tension with each other 
as academics, queer identified folks, and social activists together work toward showing 
the complexities of sexuality and identity.  
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Appendix 1: Discussion Questions 
 
Discussion Questions 
1. What led you to start questioning the way most people use gender? 
2. How relevant is your appearance to how you think about your gender? 
 
3. Along the same idea as last week, does anyone have any stories about times when you 
were treated in ways that you really did or did not like in regard to your gender? Do you 
think your treatment had anything to do with your appearance? If your treatment was not 
related to your appearance what do you think it was related to? 
 
4. What do you wear when you feel most comfortable outside your own home? Does this 
change based on where you are or who you are with? 
 
5. Would you say that social factors such as race or class have impacted how you think 
about yourself in terms of gender and or sexuality? If so how? 
 
6. Where do you typically shop for clothes? What do you like about the places you shop? 
 
7. Do you feel like being a member of an on-line community about queer(ing) gender has 
been influential/important/significant for you? Do you find that such communities give 
you support or make things in the rest of your life easier to deal with? How so? 
 
8. How do you deal with the tension between your identity and the available consumer 
goods such as clothes, make-up, and accessories that are often clearly gendered? 
